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Abstract 
In order to establish responsibility of states for internationally wrongful act, two elements are identified. First, 
the conduct in question must be attributable to the State under international law. Secondly, for responsibility to 
attach to the act of the State, the conduct must constitute a breach of an international legal obligation in force 
for that State at that time. For particular conduct to be characterized as an internationally wrongful act, it must 
first be attributable to the State. The State is a real organized entity, a legal person with full authority to act 
under international law. But to recognize this is not to deny the elementary fact that the State cannot act of itself. 
States can act only by and through their agents and representatives. In determining what constitutes an organ of 
a State for the purposes of responsibility, the internal law and practice of each State are of prime importance. 
The structure of the State and the functions of its organs are not, in general, governed by international law. It is 
a matter for each State to decide how its administration is to be structured and which functions are to be 
assumed by government. But while the State remains free to determine its internal structure and functions 
through its own law and practice, international law has a distinct role. Conduct is thereby attributed to the State 
as a subject of international law and not as a subject of internal law. The State as a subject of international law 
is held responsible for the conduct of all the organs, instrumentalities and officials which form part of its 
organization and act in that capacity, whether or not they have separate legal personality under its internal law. 
 
Keywords: international responsibility, internationally wrongful acts, state, attribution of conduct to a state, the 
subjective element. 
 
 
1.  Introductory aspects 
 Responsibility in international law is an old topic that has been the subject matter of the study 
of various entities, but it is also current. The studies conducted by experts with a view to codification 
have led to the identification of several directions of action. Thus it has been considered a 
responsibility of the states for internationally wrongful acts, but also a responsibility for prejudices 
triggered by activities allowed by international law, and also the intention has been to codify the 
responsibility of the international organizations. Each type of responsibility has raised various 
problems, which have led to long periods of time taken for conducting the works of the International 
Law Commission (I.L.C.) of UNO.
1 The completion of the works has been achieved by adopting 
various draft articles, which are subject to the works of the UNO General Assembly in order to 
establish the form that these articles should take. The same as the other types, the responsibility of the 
states for internationally wrongful acts has brought into discussion various aspects identified in the 
practice of the states and international case law. Establishing the elements necessary to triggering the 
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and the identification of the concrete cases brings into 
discussion the chargeability of the internationally wrongful acts and the breach of the international 
obligation of the state. The chargeability (attribution) of the internationally wrongful act to the state – 
the subjective element of the responsibility of the states for internationally wrongful acts – involves 
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the research of a big number of cases that will be analysed below with a view to the identification of 
the cases where a state can be held liable at international level. 
  The study of the chargeability of the internationally wrongful acts has led to various 
controversies which the ILC experts have tried to resolve also considering the guidelines of the 
international practice in the field by preparing a draft that reflects the position of the governments of 
the UNO member states.
2 It is known that the subjective element consists in the conduct of a person 
or group of persons, which due to certain characteristics needs to be attributed to the state as a subject 
of international law, and not to the person or group of persons that have initiated it. In attributing the 
wrongful act to the state, there shall be taken into account firstly the identification of the legal 
connection existent between the persons that engage the conduct and the state; secondly, we will 
consider the state as subject of international law; and thirdly, the attribution of the wrongful conduct 
shall be done in accordance with the international law norms. 
The state is an organized entity that acts in the international field by means of certain bodies 
and persons that has governmental authority, that is why, the state is charged with the acts of those 
who represent it and that have been committed in their official capacity.
3 It is thus necessary to 
determine the individual behaviours that can be considered acts of the state and those that, on the 
contrary, need to be considered actions or omissions of the private entities. 
Thus, the state will be responsible for the wrongful act of a body of the state power or of 
another entity that has the capacity to exert the prerogatives of public power. It is also attributed to 
the state the conduct of a person or of an entity that is not a body of the state power, but that is 
enabled by it to exert prerogatives of public power, or act under its management or control, even if 
this conduct is in breach of the instructions received, as well as the conduct of a body made available 
to a state by another state and that exerts public power on the behalf of the latter, the conduct of a 
person or group of persons that exerts in fact the prerogatives of public power in case of an absence 
of the official authorities, as well as the conduct of an insurrectional movement that becomes the new 
government of a state or that creates a new state.
4 
In respect of the wrongful acts conducted by private persons, the specialized literature claims 
that there is a generally applicable principle, according to which the state is not responsible for the 
acts of the private persons as such are not committed on the behalf of the state.
5 The facts of private 
persons trigger the responsibility of the state if they have been committed as a result of actions or 
omissions arising from bodies of state power, cases that may occur in the event of facts that affect the 
representative offices of foreign states or citizens of such foreign states. In such cases, the state has 
the responsibility for its own omissions, such as the failure of taking measures to prevent the 
respective acts, measures which the international law obligates the state to take or measures of 
repression conformant with the execution of its international obligations.
6 
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The process of charging the wrongful act is conducted mandatorily by observing two 
important rules, namely: the attribution of the wrongful act to the state as subject to international law 
and classification of the wrongful act in accordance with the norms of international law. 
 
2. State Authorities  
First, mention must be made of the fact that it is not relevant the position of the state body 
within the internal organizational structure and neither does the internal hierarchy.
7 This mention is 
important as in specialized literature there have been expressed opinion according to which the 
responsibility of the state can be triggered only in case of wrongful conduct of state bodies. Thus, it is 
well known the theory that claimed that only an act or omission of the body responsible for the 
foreign affairs of the state (head of state, minister of foreign affairs, diplomatic) can represent a 
wrongful act of the state. Thus it has been claimed that the state is responsible for the acts of the of 
the internal bodies, for instance, bodies that exert legislative power, administrative of judicial bodies, 
only indirectly, if the acts of the internal bodies had affected or prevented the acts of the bodies with 
foreign responsibilities.
8The theory starts from the confusion between the acts of the state bodies in 
international realm, which are perfectly valid acts, and the wrongful acts that trigger the 
responsibility of the state, which are, in fact, breaches of the international obligations. Case law and 
international practice have constantly proven that the relevant difference cannot be supported. The 
issue that has dominated the specialized literature has been whether the responsibility of the state can 
be determined by a wrongful act engaged by any of the state bodies or organs that can be excluded 
from this category. The differences have been eliminated by an analysis made per each category of 
body. In fact, so far there have not been identified any arbitral or judicial decision to establish 
whether the state will not be responsible for instance for the wrongful acts engaged by the legislative 
of judicial bodies, on the contrary, there are decisions confirming the responsibility of the state or the 
wrongful acts engaged by the state bodies, irrespective of their position in the state organizational 
structure.  
In conclusion, the international responsibility of the state is triggered in case of charging a 
state with an act of bodies belonging to the internal organizational structure. Further to analysing the 
existent doctrine and case law, it can be said that the notion of “state body” is used lato sensu, so that 
the preparation of a regulation in general terms would not lead to controversies. It is of no interest the 
internal organization of the state, what is of interest is only the capacity of state body. Still, the 
specialists in international law and international bodies with attributions regarding the codification of 
international law have deemed it necessary to mention each category of bodies, in order not to give 
way to interpretations. As a result, the conduct of each body of the state shall be considered that an 
act of the state, irrespective of the fact that that body belongs to the legislative, executive, judicial 
power or have other capacities, irrespective of the position held in the organizational structure of the 
state and independent of whether it is part of the central governmental bodies of the state or of the 
local units of the state. A body includes any person or entity that has this capacity in agreement with 
the internal law of the state.
9 
The law making authority is the vital organizational structure of a state, the problem under 
scrutiny regards the case where the body that exerts the legislative power can breach international 
obligations, thus triggering the international responsibility of the states. 
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In the international legal practice it has been considered that a state is responsible 
internationally both when the legislative bodies adopt a normative act that infringes an international 
obligation, and when it does not adopt such an act necessary for the execution of this obligation.
10 
The bodies that exert the executive power present certain particularities within the state 
organizational structure, bringing into discussion aspects related to the way of distributing the 
attribution, the position of the public servants, as well as aspects related to the local collectivities 
determined by the administrative-territorial of the state. 
The predominant opinion, which is also currently valid, claims that no distinction is made 
between the acts of the official superiors and subordinates, if they act based on their official capacity, 
it is no doubt that the official at an inferior level may have a reduced activity, not being in a position 
to make the final decision.  
The theory has been also taken over by the International Law Commission, being introduced 
in the regulation at article 4 under the phrasing “irrespective of the position held in the organizational 
structure of the state”. 
Being faithful to the opinion expressed in the specialized literature, as well as the ones 
formulated in the codification works, it is normal to assert that in case of the executive bodies it is of 
no importance the position held by the state representative or the level of the respective bodies, local 
or central.
11 Irrespective of whether it is a minister involved or a mere public servant with the local 
administration, the responsibility of the state is triggered when such persons commit wrongful acts 
based on their official capacity. The state is responsible for the wrongful act of a public servant when 
the government has been informed of the public servant’s intention and has not acted in due course or 
in the event where the wrongful act has been committed and the government does no punish the 
respective public servant. 
The state is responsible for the wrongful acts attributed to the central bodies, but also for the 
wrongful acts committed by the local communities
12. In this case, it will be considered the way of 
administrative-territorial division of a unitary state, but also federative states part of a federation.  
The principle starts from the concept of unitary state regarded as a subject of international 
law. As subject of international law the state appears as an entity “equipped” with a complex system 
of bodies that act under the its control and authority. In respect of the federal state, the internal 
organizational structure which is different from of a unitary state does not affect in any way the 
principle of the responsibility of the state for internationally wrongful acts.
13 The component states of 
the federation, although they have a certain domestic autonomy according to the constitutional 
provisions, do not have legal personality of international law, do not have the capacity of signing 
treaties and cannot be held responsible internationally. In the cases where the component units can 
sign treaties in own name
14, the other party needs agree to limit its recourse to the component unit 
that has assumed commitments, in the event of infringing an obligation. In such a case, the 
responsibility of the federal state cannot be invoked as we are not under the scope of the rules 
regarding the responsibility of the states for wrongful acts. Another possibility provides for the 
responsibility of the federal state according to the provisions of a treaty, a responsibility which is 
however limited by a federal clause inserted in the treaty
15. The cases mentioned above are 
considered exceptions to the general rules regarding the application of the treaties between the states 
that are parties to them. 
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Consequently, the legal provisions focus on the responsibility of the states for wrongful acts 
engaged by communes, provinces, regions, cantons or component states of a federal state, entities 
which from a linguistic point of view can be called former bodies of the states. 
Judicial authority is independent from the law making and executive power, according to the 
principle of separation of the state powers; however, it is a state authority that acts on the behalf of 
such state. From this point of view, the case of a court, which would infringe the norms of 
international law, could trigger the responsibility of the state. The responsibility of the state for acts 
of judicial bodies can be triggered when court decisions are adopted that run counter the norms of 
international law (solutions that ignore the immunity of jurisdiction of a diplomat or the right to be 
protected of a citizen, or disregarding an extradition treaty) and when the behaviour of the court can 
be referred to as a denial of justice (refusal to allow access to the court, denying foreign citizens the 
protection of their rights, delay in the administration of justice, the expedite conducting of judicial 
procedures, refusal to execute a court decision that is favourable to a foreigner). 
 
 
3. Persons or entities that act on the behalf of the state 
The organizational structure of the states is different and complex, thus beside the category of 
the state. 
It is attributed to the state the behaviour of a person or entity that is not a state body, but that is 
enabled to exert prerogatives of public power, even if this behaviour infringes the instructions 
received, or acts under its management or control, as well as the behaviour of a person or group of 
persons that exert in fact prerogatives of public power in case of an absence of the official authorities. 
It has been asserted that the principle of the responsibility of the state for wrongful acts 
engaged by its state bodies is not necessarily absolute or exclusive.
16 On the contrary, the analyse of 
the principle would include in the category of the acts attributed to the state, also the acts of persons 
or groups of persons that do not fall under the category of state bodies. In order to understand more 
correctly the concept of an entity authorized to exert services of public character or governmental 
authority, we will analyse the category of the para-state bodies, which can include public 
corporations, semi-public entities, all types of public agents and even in special cases private 
companies, on condition that in each case the entity should be empowered to exert public functions, 
which normally should have been exerted by the state bodies. For instance, in some states, private 
security companies can be contracted to operate as prison guards and in such case can exert public 
powers, such as maintaining the state of detention, discipline and tasks regarding the compliance 
with the prison regulation. The state or private air services can be delegated to exert undoubtedly 
functions regarding the immigration control or imposing quarantine.  
When an entity is attributed powers in order to exert elements of governmental authority, its 
nature is not taken into account, in the sense that it is disregarded whether the entity is public or 
private, or it is disregarded the state’s participation in the equity or the type of ownership over the 
goods.  
Such entities are empowered by exerting the elements of governmental authority according to 
domestic law. Against this background, mention must be made that there are taken into account only 
the activities performed that are not related to state functions and no other private or commercial 
activities in which such entities can be engaged. Thus, for instance, the management of a railway 
company involving the ensuring of safety activities is regarded as an activity of the state according to 
international law, other activities, such as the distribution of tickets, do not fall under the category of 
the activities analysed.  
To international law, it is relevant the connection established between entities and the state in 
order to be able to analyse the chargeability of the wrongful acts committed on the behalf of the state. 
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Considering the claims by the practice and doctrine of international law, I.L.C. has instated 
the rule mentioned in art.5, thus: the conduct of a person or entity that is not a body of the state 
according to art.4, but that is empowered according to domestic law to exert elements of 
governmental authority, can be considered an act of the state according to international law, 
specifying that the person or entity acts in a specific case. 
The legal provision regulates the position of the entities analysed above, the category 
mentioned not being provided for in art.4 that refers only to the entities that act as state bodies, 
irrespective of the position held in the organizational structure of the state. The wording is general 
and the state entities and activities that can be exerted are to be determined by the way of internal 
organization of the state, by the tradition instated and last but not least by the historic evolution of the 
concepts. 
We have pointed out that the wrongful act can be charged to the state due to the wrongful 
conducts engaged by the state bodies or by the wrongful conducts engaged by entities that exert 
elements of governmental authority. Further on, we will focus on the cases where the wrongful acts 
are engaged by persons or groups of persons that do not have a well-defined position within the 
organizational structure of the state, but that can determined, by their wrongful acts, the international 
responsibility of the state. 
There is a considerable number of cases, where a person or even a group of persons that, 
although they do not hold an official position according to the internal order can find themselves in a 
position to exert certain functions, which are normally exerted by state bodies. As we know, the 
conduct of private persons is not attributed to the state, thus the wrongful acts engaged by private 
persons cannot trigger the international responsibility of the state unless under special conditions. It is 
worth mentioning the role played by the principle of effectiveness in international law, which focuses 
on the real relation established between an individual or group of individuals and the mechanisms of 
the state. According to the domestic law, the state often assumes responsibility for the acts committed 
by private persons that exceptionally exert public functions in the stead of lawful public servants, 
who omit to exert such functions or are faced with an impossibility to do that. Similarly, the state is 
considered responsible for the acts of the persons authorized to perform especially public services, or 
for the acts of individuals or groups of individuals that have been authorized to carry out missions for 
the state.  
The state, in its capacity of subject of international law, could be responsible for the wrongful 
acts committed by various categories of persons that are not authorized to perform activities, 
directed, controlled missions or missions according to the instructions of the state. The performance 
of the specified missions in an improper manner leading to infringing the international obligations 
assumed triggers the international responsibility of the state. The effectiveness principle, asserted 
strongly in the analysis made, requires the setting of clear cut criteria showing in a certain manner the 
relation between the mechanisms of the state and the conduct of the respective person. An act by a 
person empowered with legal capacity is not necessarily an act of the state, if the respective person 
acts in private capacity. Similarly, it is but logical that the acts of a private person who in one way or 
another conducts activities or missions under the coordination of the state can be considered acts of 
the state and can trigger the international responsibility.  
Charging the states with the authorized conduct of persons or groups of persons is recognized 
by international practice usually in the cases where persons or groups of persons are used as forces 
ancillary to the armed forces or sent as volunteers to the neighbouring countries, but also in the cases 
where the persons are charged with certain missions in foreign territories.
17 
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In respect of the aspect presented above, in some cases there has been developed the concept 
of the de facto official, and, in order to justify the concept mentioned above, it has sometimes been 
invoked the theory of appearance, some other times, the theory of necessity or negotiorum gestio
18. 
However, there are of no interest the various justifications of the validity of the acts performed 
according to the internal law of the state, as this has to do with international legal order. Considering 
the acts committed as acts of the state according to international law is independent from the 
attribution of the acts according to the domestic law, even is common aspects might exist. As an 
example of a de facto official, we may refer to a person that assumes public offices without being 
expressly appointed to a position; they might have been appointed occasionally or although they 
conducted a regular activity, they have been suspended for a certain period of time. In such cases, it 
has been asserted that the respective person only apparently exert this position in a regular manner, 
these acts are not of the officials’, but can exceed official capacities or may be unlawful, as the 
person that acts is not a person with an official capacity. According to the facts above this is a private 
person that exerts public offices. Nevertheless, the acts and decisions are perfectly valid, according to 
domestic law, as against a third person. That is why it is normal that such acts should be considered 
acts of the state according to international law. Such a conduct is attributed to the state only if it is 
directly controlled, directed, a specific operation, and the challenged conduct has been an integral 
part of the operation conducted.  
The principle does not extend to a conduct that has been only incidental or to a certain extent 
associated with the operation or when the operation has broken loose from the direction or control of 
the state. Thus, establishing the degree of control that can be exerted by the state so that the conduct 
should be attributed to it has been the key of resolving the case Military and Paramilitary Activities 
in Nicaragua.
19 
The above clearly show that the responsibility of the state for the acts of the persons or groups 
of persons is triggered only when such persons or groups of persons act according to the instructions 
or under the guidance or control of the state to meet the conditions of the conduct. 
Closely following the principles derived from the international practice, I.L.C. has aimed, 
throughout its activity of codifying the responsibility of the state for internationally wrongful acts, at 
regulating the principle stating that a conduct charged against a person or group of persons can be 
considered an act of the state, if such persons or groups of persons act according to the instructions or 
guidance or control of the state.
20There are considered three variants, namely – instruction, guidance, 
control -, being enough to establish one single variant in order to have a wrongful act attributed to the 
state. 
 
4.Ultra vires Acts 
The problem is whether it is possible to attribute to the state the conduct of its bodies, which 
act in their official capacity, but exerting in excess the competencies attributed according to the 
domestic law has been a matter of interest for the specialists in international law for a rather long 
period of time. The difficulties have been determined first of all by the concept supported by older 
theoreticians, who based on the premise that state organization is determined exclusively by the 
domestic law of the state have been wrong to say that it is impossible to attribute to the state the 
action of entities that are not state bodies or that although they have this capacity do not act according 
to the provisions of the domestic law. The analysis regarding the conditions under which an action or 
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omission by a body of the state that acts in excess authority or contrary to the instructions received 
triggers the responsibility of the state, will be made by a diligent research of the practise of the states, 
judicial decisions and specialized literature.
21 The rule invoked involves the need for clarity and 
security of the international relations. 
The practise of the states’ existent in the second half of XIX century seems to be in 
agreement, on both sides of the Atlantic, to assert the idea that the states need to accept the 
responsibility for the facts of their bodies, even if the acts committed are manifested outside the 
attributed competencies or run counter to the legal provisions. Although in principle the states on the 
European continent had a rather similar position to that of the United States, there still existed 
differences on the basis of triggering responsibility. It was claimed that the responsibility of the states 
for the ultra vires acts of the officials is determined by the position of the body in the hierarchical 
structure of the state, the European States being against such a distinction.  
In XX century, it was noted a recognition of the rule, as being a principle of international 
law.
22 During the preparing works for the Hague Conference, the government of the member states 
were questioned with regard to the principle according to which the responsibility of the state is 
triggered in case of committing wrongful acts by the state bodies that act contrary to the legal 
provisions or in excess of authority. The participants in the Conference adopted an article that 
established that the international responsibility is chargeable to the states if the damage incurred by a 
foreigner are the result of unauthorized acts of the officials acting officially, if the actions run counter 
to the international obligations of the states. 
The criteria that prevailed in the Codification Conference in Hague did not suffer big changes, 
the practice of the states from 1930 to date has proven the recognition of this principle.
23 Constantly, 
it has been established that the responsibility of the states is engaged for the acts of the military, if 
force had resulted from an official duty and the military acted under the command of an officer. It 
has been proven in numerous cases that what is chargeable to the state is the negligence of the officer 
that exerts control over the soldiers under their command.
24 
  As a result, it is recognized the theory according to which it is chargeable to the state 
internationally its responsibility for the wrongful acts committed by its officials or bodies that act 
contrary to the orders received or in excess of authority.
25 Wrongful acts committed by the bodies or 
agencies of the state trigger responsibility, even if there has been no specific authorization. The type 
of responsibility under scrutiny cannot find its basis in the general principles and we refer here to the 
principles that govern the internal organization of the state (an allegation supported by the older 
theoreticians of international law). An action performed by the bodies or agencies of the state is 
considered an action of the state only if it is performed according to the legal provisions and it 
remains within the limits of the regulated competency. Thus, an action performed outside the 
competency, is not an action of the state and will not trigger the responsibility of the state. 
International life is, however, much more complex and uncertain and accepting the exclusion of the 
responsibility of the state for the wrongful acts of the state bodies that exceed the attributed 
competency or run counter the instruction received would make difficult the conducting of 
international rapports. That is why it has been considered correct to establish the responsibility of the 
state for the wrongful acts committed by its bodies or agents or organisms that exert public offices, 
establishing the objective character in order to guarantee the international security. In order to allow 
the triggering of the objective responsibility, the actions taken by the bodies that act outside the 
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competency need to be actions that create the appearance that those bodies act in official capacity or 
have used methods and powers outside the official competency.
26This theory was at the basis of the 
arbitral decision ruled in the Caire case. 
This rule was reaffirmed in the Mosse case, which states: even if it had been noted that the 
officials acted outside the legally established competency, it could not be admitted that the request is 
ungrounded. It would be necessary to establish whether in international order the state could be 
considered responsible for the actions taken by the officials apparently within the limit of their 
positions, according to a conduct that was not fully contrary to the instructions received.
27 
The responsibility of the state for the internationally wrongful acts committed by state bodies 
outside the competency attributed or contrary to the instructions received has been recognized also 
by the International Courts and Tribunals of Human Rights.
28 For instance, the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights established in the Valesquez Rodriquez case that the breaching of the Convention 
was independent of whether the official had acted contrary to the provisions of the domestic law or 
above the limits of the authority conferred, in international law the states being considered 
responsible for the actions or omissions of the agents that acted according to their official capacity, 
even if the agents acted outside the attributed authority or breached the norms of the domestic law, as 
they acted under the appearance of the official capacity.
29 
At first sight, further to analysing the theories mentioned above, winning position seems to be 
held by the traditional theory according to which the state is not responsible for the actions of the 
bodies or entities that exert elements of government authority, actions that have been taken contrary 
to the instructions received or in excess of authority, as this would be contrary to the principle that 
establishes the way of internal organization of a state. However, the reference is international order 
and not domestic order and in international realm the state is considered responsible for the acts 
committed by its bodies or agents, as the state has failed to take all the necessary measures to 
eliminate such cases. It is important to clarify whether the officials have acted based on the state 
authority or whether the action does not correspond to the set of functions held and then another case 
comes into attention, namely the status of the private actions that are not attributed to the state. The 
distinction between the acts not authorized but performed under an official capacity and the private 
conduct is difficult to make and involves a careful analysis of each case. 
The opinions expressed in the specialized literature, the practise of the states and rich case law 
have helped ILC in its efforts of codification to form a grounded opinion and to assert that the rule is 
worth introducing in the draft regarding the responsibility of the states and thus it refers to the 
conduct of a body of the state or of a person or entity empowered to exert elements of governmental 
authority and mentions that this conduct can be considered an action of the state according to the 
international law, even if the body, person or entity acts in excess of authority or contrary to the 
instructions received. 
We note that an essential condition is the legal relation between the entities that act and the 
state, this relation determining essentially the responsibility. Entities are state bodies, irrespective of 
their place in the organizational structure, or persons or entities empowered with elements of the 
governmental authority. It therefore results that several conditions are met: a set of attributions, a 
competency established according to the legal provisions and entities that act exceeding their legal 
competencies or contrary to the instructions received without, however, having any authorization in 
this respect. It can thus be considered that the theory of appearance supported by the United States 
from the very beginning finds its applicability in the cases where the provisions of art. 7 are 
                                                 
26 R. McCorquodale, M. Dixon, op.cit., p.413. 
27 M. Shaw, op.cit., p.549. 
28 European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, 2004, 
para.319. 
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applicable. We point out that if the appearance of official position did not exist, then it would be 
obvious that the entities mentioned above would act in a private capacity. It is obvious that the aim is 
not to formulate justifications to avoid the cases of responsibility of the states, but neither should we 
exaggerate in considering all the wrongful acts committed as acts of the state.  
 
5.Conduct manifested in the absence or lack of official authorities 
This principle is manifested as legitimate in art.4, paragraph A(6) of the Geneva Convention 
of 12 August 1949 regarding the treatment of the war prisoners, as well as other legal international 
instrument. The recognition of this principle does nothing else than bring back to the attention of the 
specialized literature the existence of the rule levee en masse, which can be identified with the cases 
of legitimate defence of the citizens in the absence of the regular forces, it is a form of ”agency of 
necessity”. Practice has proven that there can be identified such cases, thus raising the problem of 
assuming responsibility. In the Yeager v. The Islamic Republic of Iran case, the position of the 
Revolutionary Guards or the “Komitehs” immediately after the revolution in Iran was treated based 
on the rule analysed by the Court set up upon that occasion. The Court granted compensations for the 
acts of expelling, but in this case the acts were performed by the Revolutionary Guards after the 
success of the revolution. Although the Revolutionary Guards did not have at the time the capacity of 
official bodies of the Iranian state, it was established that they exerted the governmental authority, 
this aspect being known and approved, thus triggering Iran’s responsibility for the actions of the 
Guards.
30 In a different development, in the Rankin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran case, the Court 
noted that the claimant failed to prove that he had left Iran after the revolution as a result of the 
actions of the Iranian government or of the Revolutionary Guards or that he had simply left Iran due 
to the difficult life conditions existent during the revolution. As such, the responsibility of the Iranian 
state could not be engaged.
31 
As it can be seen, the setting up of the respective entities is determined by special 
circumstances arisen in case of revolutions, armed conflicts, foreign occupations, when the legal 
authorities are dissolved or suppressed becoming non operative. The circumstances need to be such 
as to generate the necessity of exerting the elements of government authority by private persons. The 
exerting of elements of government authority can be determined by the absence or actual lack of the 
official authorities legally constituted, which leads to a complete collapse of the state apparatus or 
partial collapse by losing the authority over a part of the territory.
32 
In this respect, we welcome the rule instated by the draft articles, meant to cover a wide range 
of cases identified in practice, according to which the conduct of a person or group of persons can be 
considered an act of the state, according to international law if the person or group of persons exert in 
fact elements of governmental authority in the absence or lack of official authority in circumstances 
that require the exercise of such elements of authority.
33 
From the analysis of the provisions presented above we consider that there can be identified 
three conditions that need to be met in order to engage the responsibility of the state: the conduct 
should actually reflect the exerting of the elements of governmental authority; the conduct should be 
exerted in the absence or lack of official authority; the existing circumstances should require the 
exertion of governmental authority. 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 M.Shaw, op.cit.,p.552. 
31 Idem. 
32 Such a case should not be mistaken for the situation of the de facto governments, the latter being part of the 
state structure and replace the governments that existed before them. 
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6. Insurectional movements or other internal unrest 
The possibility of the responsibility of the state for wrongful acts committed by bodies of 
insurrectional movement is analysed generally in relation to the problem of the responsibility of the 
state for the acts committed by private persons during the internal unrest, the violent rallies. The 
movement is in essence a “temporary” topic, the length of its existence coincides with the length of 
the fight against the state, thus, if the fight is suppressed, its existence is finalized and its 
organizational structure is dissolved. If the movement is victorious, two cases may arise: the 
insurrectional movement may take over the control over the organizational structure of the old state 
or a new state may appear.
34 
The first case elaborates on the annihilated insurrectional movement, a case where the 
specialized literature has identified certain particularities. As a general principle, the acts of some 
insurgents that violate international law (harming representatives of foreign states, diplomatic 
missions, foreign citizens and their properties) cannot be charged to the states, as this case resembles, 
from this point of view, the acts of private persons. Still, the state is responsible also in such cases for 
the lack of “due diligence” in adopting – if possible – adequate measures of protection or 
repression.
35 A wide scope support of the principle is included in arbitral case law.
36 Although the 
case of exoneration from responsibility might constitute a principle, the doctrine claims that it could 
not be applied to cases where the state has the obligation of due diligence.
37 
We mention that there is no difference between the case where negligence of the state occurs 
before the insurrectional movement should have an active existence and the subsequent case, where, 
for instance, the internal restoration took place and the state authority has omitted to punish the 
authors of the acts committed during the insurrectional movements. 
The elimination of the international responsibility for the wrongful acts of the state can be 
justified in case where it acts with a view to annihilating the insurrectional movement, the case of the 
internal conflict might constitute an event of force majeure. The rule is easy to support with 
arguments, but difficult to apply in the context of the general rules under scrutiny. 
In conclusion we can say that the annihilated insurrectional movement does not trigger the 
responsibility of the state for the wrongful acts committed by the agents of the insurrection during the 
rebellion, apart from the case where it can be invoked the fact that the state had the obligation of due 
diligence and failed to meet this obligation.
38 On the other hand, the state is not responsible for the 
actions committed during the military operations conducted in order to annihilate the movement, 
only if it has caused damage which is not justified in the given circumstances. Thus the defeated 
insurrection does not engage the responsibility of the state for the acts of the rebels, but the state is, 
however, responsible for the acts of its agents.
39 The elimination of responsibility can be achieved by 
invoking the existence of internal unrest, which may constitute an event of force majeure. This 
conclusion is also shared by the International Law Commission which states that the acts of the 
insurrectional movement cannot be attributed to the state, they can be charged only if they are 
classified as acts of the state (as per art. 4 to 9
40). 
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The success of the insurrectional movement can lead to radical changes to the state against 
which is has fought, the result being the affecting of the continuity of the state and major changes to 
its identity. The organizational structure of the pre-existent state ceases to exist, forming a new state 
on the same territory, with an international personality different from the one of the state that has 
disappeared. On the other hand, the victory of the insurrectional movement can lead to the apparition 
of a new state on a part of the territory of the pre-existent state or within the territory under the 
administration of the state. 
The basic principle regarding the attribution of the conduct of the victorious movement or of 
another movement to the state, according to the international law, is determined by the relation 
between the movement and the governmental bodies. We mention that the word “conduct” regards 
the conduct of the insurrectional movement and not the conduct of the members of the movement 
that can act in own interest. 
In case where the insurrectional movement, as new form of government replaces the prior 
form, the organizational rules of the insurrection become organizational rules of the new state. The 
continuity existent between the newly established state and the victorious insurrectional movement 
constitutes a thorough justification to be able to attribute to the new state the acts committed by the 
insurrection during the fight. In such a case, the state does not cease to exist as subject of 
international law, it remains the same entity, in spite of the changes occurred, being reorganized and 
adapted from an institutional point of view. We point out that the acts attributed to the new state are 
acts committed by the insurrection with a view to winning the fight and forming the new 
government. 
Another form of continuity considers the case where the bodies of the insurrectional 
movement become bodies of the new state established further to decolonization on a part of the 
territory of the predecessor state or on the territory under the administration of the predecessor state. 
The notion of territory needs to be understood as being a part of the territory of the predecessor state 
over which the movement has obtained sovereignty as a result of the fight conducted or any territory 
that was under a regime of dependence. 
The practice of the states, the arbitral decisions and the specialized literature have confirmed 
the two cases.
41 
The decisions of the international courts and recent practice undoubtedly confirm the 
application of the principle of the responsibility of the state for the wrongful acts committed by the 
victorious insurrectional movement. The Short vs. Iran case, settled by The Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal with decision of 1987, proves the possibility of applying the rule under scrutiny only 
when all the specific circumstances are identified in the case. Thus, the plaintiff, Mr. Short, claimed 
damages for losing the benefits of the workplace and personal property caused by his forced 
expulsion from Iran further to the Islamic Revolution of 1978-1979. The plaintiff invoked the acts 
committed by the revolutionaries trying to attribute the responsibility for these acts to the government 
that was instated further to the success of the revolution. Still, there were not identified the persons 
that acted as agents of the revolutionary movement and that forced him to leave the Iranian territory. 
The acts of the supporters of a revolution cannot be attributed to the government instated further to 
the success of the revolution, the same as the acts of the supporters of the previous government 
cannot be attributed to the new government
42, which can also be found expressed in the ILC draft
43-
art.10. 
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The term of insurrectional movement used by the ILC in para.1,art.10 does not cover all the 
categories of manifestations in practice of these movements. That is why, under para. 2, it is 
attempted an extension of the concept, and art.10, para. 1 covers the case where the victorious 
movement substitutes the organizational structure of the predecessor state, by the phrase “which 
becomes the new government”, by designating the consequences.  
However, the provisions mentioned above do not cover the case where the conflict ends by a 
national reconciliation between the authorities of the state and the leaders of the insurrectional 
movement. We consider that this case can be classified legally, according to the terms of the national 
reconciliation, if the reconciliation regarding the maintaining of the governmental authorities of the 
predecessor state or the takeover of power by the leaders of the movement, this leaving room for 
joint liability. If the power is taken over by the leaders of the movement, the case can be classified 
under the scope of the provisions of art. 10, whereas in case of the continuity of the predecessor state, 
the problem is more difficult to deal with, that is why another separate legal provision would have 
been necessary in this respect. 
There is no distinction between the categories of movements, considering the legitimacy of 
the acts undertaken in order to form the new government. 
The analysis of the text of art. 10 shows that the responsibility of the insurrectional 
movements or of other similar manifestations does not fall under the scope of the purpose pursued by 
the Draft regarding the international responsibility of the states for wrongful acts. However, the 
existence of the responsibility of the defeated insurrectional movement cannot be denied, although it 
is not regulated. For instance, such an entity could be considered responsible for the violation of the 
rules of the international humanitarian law by its forces. 
  
7. Responsibility of the states for wrongful acts engaged by bodies of other states. 
The development of the international society, by adaptation to various historical periods has 
led to the apparition of a big number of subjects of international law, resulting in the diversification 
and intensification of the rapports between them. The most numerous rapports are recorded between 
the states, thus a state can make available to another state a certain category of bodies or can 
participate in conducting activities of common interest with other states. The rapport created have 
international consequences, in this respect, considering the topic under scrutiny, we will deal with the 
consequences vis-a-vis the international responsibility. 
The first case that we will subject to analysis is that in which a state makes available to 
another state certain bodies, be them individual or collective, so that the respective state can use them 
in order to perform certain activities or public functions. In practice, such cases may for instance take 
one of the following shapes: a state makes available to another state a police contingent or a 
contingent of armed forces so that together with the forces of the beneficiary state it can resist the 
insurrectional movements or foreign aggression; a state may send to another state a detachment that 
ensures the medical services, a hospital or bodies that ensure other types of services in order to give 
assistance in case of an epidemic or a natural disaster; the authorization of the officials of a state to 
ensure on the territory of a third state services for another state whose officials cannot provide for 
various reasons.  
                                                                                                                                      
law;2. The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a new State in part 
of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its administration shall be considered an 
act of the new State under international law; 3. This article is without prejudice to the attribution to a State of 
any conduct, however related to that of the movement concerned, which is to be considered an act of that State by 
virtue of articles 4 to 9.  Felicia Maxim 1097 
A different case is when the bodies of the sending state travel on the territory of the 
beneficiary state in order to give aid or assistance, but the directions, control or instructions are still 
given by the state to which the bodies belong.
44  
The cases presented above underscore the fact that the delimitation of the activities needs to 
be carefully made also according to the circumstances existent on case by case basis. This should not 
be mistaken for the cases of the states which given the situation they were in – dependence, 
protectorate, under mandate, military occupation – had to accept the presence of the bodies of 
another state on their territory or had to make available their own state bodies to the state to which 
they were subordinated. 
The authors of public international law have supported the principle, as it has been justified 
by the international practice and case law. Brownlie and Durante have been the only ones that have 
paid a greater attention to explaining the principle of the responsibility of the states for the wrongful 
acts committed by the bodies made available to another state. Without pointing out the existing 
particularities, Brownlie claimed that the beneficiary state was responsible,
45 on the contrary, 
Durante underscored the importance of proving the subject that coordinated and controlled the 
activity of the engaged bodies. It is important to note that the international practice and case law have 
left a defining mark. Thus, the principle was applied by the arbitral decision dated 9 July 1931 in the 
Chevreau de by Judge Beichmann, who rules his decision on the basis of the compromise signed in 
London on 4 March 1930 by France and Great Britain.
46  
The phrase “made available to another state” expresses the essential condition that needs to be 
proven so that the wrongful act engaged by the respective body should be attributed to the 
beneficiary state and not to the state to which it normally belongs. Performing various activities 
under the control or directions of another state involves unequivocally the determination of the 
activities performed, namely their type and the time span in which it is acted in order to fulfil the 
functions entrusted by the requesting state, exclusively under the direction and control of the 
beneficiary state. The bodies in question need to have the capacity of bodies of the sending state, on 
the one hand, and on the other hand the conduct engaged should involve elements of the 
governmental authority of the beneficiary state. As a result, private entities and individuals cannot 
have the capacity of state bodies. For instance, the experts made available to another state according 
to a program of technical assistance do not have the capacity of state bodies. 
The deriving conclusions is the following: in case of wrongful conduct engaged by the bodies 
of a state, the beneficiary state will be responsible, if the respective bodies had the capacity of bodies 
of the sending state and if they exerted elements of governmental authority in the beneficiary state, 
being an integral part of its internal organizational structure. 
The analysis cannot be concluded here, as the practice and case law of international law have 
also identified the case of the states that act jointly triggering the responsibility of a state with regard 
to the act of another state. It has been claimed that the existence of a wrongful conduct is often 
determined by the joint action of several states, the cases where a state acts alone being less 
frequent.
47 There are also cases where several states act independently, but with a view to achieving a 
common goal or cases where the states acted by means of a common body. The wrongful act may be 
generated in cases where a state acts on the behalf of another state in fulfilling the respective tasks. 
There are also circumstances where the wrongful conduct of a state depends on the independent 
action of another state. A state can engage a conduct together with another state already involved, 
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thus the conduct engaged by the intervenient state can be relevant or even decisive in determining the 
existence of infringing the international obligation by the first state. We mention that it is considered 
the responsibility triggered by the wrongful conducts committed within the international 
organizations. 
There can be brought into discussion also the responsibility of a state that deliberately forced 
another state to commit an wrongful act. In such cases, the responsibility of the forcing state towards 
the third state derives from the acts of forcing, the responsibility being determined by the wrongful 
conduct committed by the action of the forcing state. There can be identified two different rapports: 
the first rapport arises between the state that commits the acts of forcing and the forced state and the 
second rapport arises between the forced state and the state victim as a result of the wrongful act 
committed by the forced state.  
With regard to these aspects, the comments on the draft articles regarding the responsibility of 
the states say that the cases of forcing can equal the invoking of an event of force majeure. Forcing 
that equals force majeure can determine a cases of absence of the wrongful act of the forced state. As 
a result, the act of the forced state cannot be considered wrongful act, however, it can be considered 
an act committed under the control of directions of another state. As a result, by invoking the 
directions or control exerted by another state, the responsibility of the forcing state could be 
triggered. On the contrary, if the forcing state was not found guilty, the victim state would be 
disadvantaged as it would not be able to cover the damage caused. In practice, the forcing is manifest 
under various forms starting from the use of force, the intervention in the internal affairs of another 
state or serious economic pressure, forms that can unequivocally lead to committing wrongful acts.  
In such a case, where it is invoked the forcing by another state, Romania was also subject to. 
In the dispute between Romania and the United States, the request of the American government 
regarding the destruction of the oil storage facilities that belonged to an American company at the 
request of the Romanian government during World War II was initially formulated against the 
British government. The prejudice was effected when Romania was at war with Germany, which was 
preparing to invade Romania. Thus, the United States asked the Romanian authorities to cooperate 
with Great Britain in order to take the necessary measures. The British government denied 
responsibility saying that its influence exerted on the Romanian authorities had not exceeded the 
limits of good counselling between the governments of the states associated in such cases. The 
central point of the dispute was not represented in fact by determining the responsibility of a state for 
the wrongful acts committed under the pressure of another state, but rather the existence of forcing.
48 
In this field, the ILC draft includes norms of international law that generate controversies 
even today. For instance, the case of a body made available to a state by another state has been 
introduced in Chapter II, which has aimed at codification
49special circumstances determined by the 
subjective element of responsibility. With regard to the responsibility of the state in respect of the act 
of another state, a lengthy analysis has led to the preparation of a separate chapter. Chapter IV thus 
includes in four articles rules regarding: the responsibility of the state in case of giving aid or 
assistance to another state; the responsibility of the states when they have exerted directions and 
control with a view to committing a wrongful act by another state; the case of engaging a wrongful 
conduct by a state forced by another state, as well as the effects of the respective norms. 
The research of the practice of states, international case law and doctrine has led to many 
divergent opinions even if we are talking about a 50-year long experience. 
                                                 
48Hackworth Green Haywood, Digest of Internaţional Law, vol V, (U.S.Government Printing Office, 
Washington,1943),p.702 . 
49 Article 6. Conduct of organs placed at the disposal of a State by another State-The conduct of an organ 
placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall be considered an act of the former State under international law if 
the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed.  Felicia Maxim 1099 
A part of the authors of international law has criticized rather harshly the approach of ILC. 
Thus, it is claimed that articles 4-11 approach these matters by the term “attribution”, which indicates 
when an act should be considered an act of the state. These rules are generally traditional and reflect 
mainly a codification of the existent customary law, rather than a significant development of law. In 
spite of the apparent concrete character, the standards established under some rules lead to important 
ambiguities and their application will often require finding significant facts and rationales. For 
instance, the phrases “government authorities” or persons “under the guidance and control of the 
state” have been explained by resorting to the decisions ruled by international tribunals that have 
approached these matters in rather different manners. The state authorities are defined as being all the 
categories of bodies that are part of the internal organizational structure of a state according to the 
internal law. But internal law may be an imperfect or incomplete guide or may not include any 
relevant provisions, so that particular circumstances will be determined outside the national law. The 
extent to which states should be held responsible for the behaviour that involves private actors is a 
contemporary topic with an increased significance. Still, the attribution rules as established represent 
only the tip of the iceberg in respect of the cases where private acts may trigger the responsibility of 
the state. Thus, the compliance by the state with the environmental agreements depend in most cases 
not only on the action of the state, but also on the action of private parties whose incapacity of 
reducing pollution to the levels required by an agreement may lead to the violation of the obligation 
by the state.
50  
 
 
Conclusions 
The analysis of the subjective element of the wrongful act makes us adopt a rather uncertain 
position expressed by the phrase “too much or too little”. The purpose is to identify general elements 
that should determine the preparation of a convention or document of a general character. The 
identification of particular cases, from our point of view, and their introduction in the content of a 
general approach cannot be considered as correct. Subsequently, a point may be reached where there 
may be identified other cases of a special character leading to the possibility of invoking the fact that 
the state is not responsible. Mention must be made that the aim is to prepare a set of rules regarding 
the responsibility of the state, irrespective of whether it is about an action or omission, irrespective of 
whether it is a victorious revolutionary movement or a defeated one, etc. If the intention is to identify 
other entities that should be responsible for improper international conduct, then it should firstly be 
established whether these entities can have or not the capacity of subject of international law or in 
what capacity they are responsible internationally. 
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